Civil Procedure - Executory Process - Requirement of Authentic Evidence to Prove Endorsement of Mortgage Note by Butler, Robert B., III
Louisiana Law Review
Volume 22 | Number 3
April 1962
Civil Procedure - Executory Process - Requirement
of Authentic Evidence to Prove Endorsement of
Mortgage Note
Robert B. Butler III
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews and Journals at LSU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion
in Louisiana Law Review by an authorized editor of LSU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact kreed25@lsu.edu.
Repository Citation
Robert B. Butler III, Civil Procedure - Executory Process - Requirement of Authentic Evidence to Prove Endorsement of Mortgage Note, 22 La.
L. Rev. (1962)
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.lsu.edu/lalrev/vol22/iss3/11
NOTES
CIVIL PROCEDURE - EXECUTORY PROCESS - REQUIREMENT OF
AUTHENTIC EVIDENCE TO PROVE ENDORSEMENT OF
MORTGAGE NOTE
In an action governed by the 1870 Code of Practice, plain-
tiffs sought to enforce several alleged debts through the use of
executory process. The debts were represented by promissory
notes. Each note was paraphed for identification with an au-
thentic act of mortgage which recited that the notes were made
payable by the mortgagors to the order of "Ourselves," repre-
sented a debt owed to the holder or holders of the notes, and
had been delivered to the mortgagees' agent. However, there
was no authentic evidence identifying plaintiffs as the mort-
gagees for whom the agent acted, and none to prove that the
notes had been endorsed in blank. Defendants sought to arrest
the seizure and sale, by injunction, on the ground that plaintiffs
had not shown themselves to be holders of the notes by authentic
evidence. The First Circuit Court of Appeal held plaintiffs not
entitled to executory process because they could not show them-
selves holders by authentic evidence.' In oral argument before
the Supreme Court, defendants conceded that plaintiffs were the
original and only holders of the notes, and were the mortgagees
for whom the named agent acted in accepting delivery.2 Held,
reversed. As original and only holders of the notes, plaintiffs
were entitled to executory process even though the mortgage did
not show the notes to be endorsed in blank. It was sufficient,
under the facts of this case, that the mortgage showed the notes
to have been delivered to, and accepted by, the plaintiffs.
LiRocchi v. Keen, 242 La. 111, 134 So. 2d 893 (1961).3
1. LiRoechi v. Keen, 127 So. 2d 44 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1961) ; LiRocchi v.
Keen, 127 So. 2d 47 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1961).
2. The court does not state where the concession took place. However, an
examination of the petition for rehearing and its answer reveals that the court
considered this concession to have been made on oral argument before it.
3. There were two dissents. Justice McCaleb dissented for the reason given by
the court of appeal, i.e., because plaintiffs could not prove themselves holders by
authentic evidence. Justice Summers' dissent pointed out that there was no au-
thentic evidence to show delivery of the notes to the plaintiffs, since they were
not named in the mortgage. Though he did 'not say so, his dissent indicates that
he would have agreed with the majority had plaintiffs been named in the act of
mortgage.
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Under the 1870 Code of Practice, a creditor was entitled to
enforce a mortgage by executory process when the mortgage
was contained in an authentic act importing a confession of
judgment.4  Recognizing that executory process is a harsh
remedy, the courts have consistently required that all requisites
for its issuance be strictly met.5 Thus one seeking executory
enforcement of a mortgage must prove every muniment and
link in his claim by authentic evidence."
Since a mortgage executed in connection with a note is an
accessory to the debt which the note is given to represent, title
to the mortgage follows title to the note; the owner or holder
of the note is also the owner of the mortgage. 7 One in possession
of the note, whether as original creditor or transferee, is entitled
to executory process if he can demonstrate by authentic evi-
dence that the note was endorsed to him or was bearer paper.s
If he does this, he has given authentic proof that he is the note's
holder.9 Presumably, however, either an original creditor or
4. La. Code of Practice arts. 732, 733 (1870).
5. Myrtle Grove Packing Co. v. Mones, 226 La. 287, 76 So. 2d 305 (1954)
Bank of Leesville v. Wingate, 123 La. 386, 48 So. 1005 (1909) ; Calhoun v.
Mechanics' & Traders' Bank, 30 La. Ann. 772 (1878) ; Robb v. Potts, 2 La.
Ann. 552 (1847) ; Courtney v. Andrews, 10 Rob. 180 (La. 1845).
6. Myrtle Grove Packing Co. v. Mones, 226 La. 287, 76 So. 2d 305 (1954)
(discrepancy between note identified in act of mortgage and note sued upon) ;
Ardoino v. Hulse, 158 La. 997, 105 So. 41 (1925) (no authentic evidence to
identify person granting mortgage as mortgagor's agent) ; Miller, Lyon & Co. v.
Cappel, 36 La. Ann. 264 (1884) (no authentic evidence of transfer of mortgage
note) ; Allied Finance Co. v. Robertson, 131 So. 2d 122 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1961)
(no authentic evidence of transfer of note); Commercial Credit Co. v. Melba
Candy Co., 3 La. App. 267 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1926) (failure to file note sued
upon in district court).
7. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 2645 (1870): "The sale or transfer of a credit in-
cludes everything which is an accessory to the same; as suretyship, privileges
and mortgages"; Succession of Forstall, 39 La. Ann. 1052, 3 So. 277 (1887) ;
Gardner v. Maxwell, 27 La. Ann. 561 (1875) ; Race v. Bruen, 11 La. Ann. 34
(1856).
8. Franek v. Brewster, 141 La. 1031, 76 So. 187 (1916) (mortgage recited
note payable to order of maker and endorsed by him) ; Mathe v. McCrystal, 11
La. Ann. 4 (1856) (mortgage recited note payable to order of maker and en-
dorsed by him) ; Duvigneaud v. Marcello, 136 So. 2d 176 (La. App. 4th Cir.
1962) (mortgage recited note payable to order of maker and endorsed by him) ;
General Contract Purchase Corp. v. Doyle, 56 So. 2d 432 (La. App. Orl. Cir.
1952) (mortgage recited note payable to mortgagee or bearer) ; Nolen v. David-
son's Succession, 190 So. 826 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1939) (mortgage recited note
payable to mortgagee or bearer). Prior to 1856 there were cases holding that
even if there were authentic evidence showing that the note was negotiable by
delivery, still executory process was not available unless the transfer of the note
was shown by authentic evidence. Tufts, Fermor & Co. v. Beard, 9 La. Ann. 310
(1854) ; Lee v. Dearmond, 4 La. 320 (1832). However, these cases were over-
ruled in the Mathe case, supra. The present rule is that if there is authentic
evidence that the note is negotiable by delivery, there need be no authentic evi-
dence of its transfer.
9. The person who is in possession of a note and who is its payee or endorsee
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transferee is entitled to proceed via executiva whenever he can
show himself the note's owner by authentic evidence, even though
he cannot so show himself its holder.'0 The Barker case appears
to have reached this result with respect to an original creditor,
i.e., the person to whom the makers of the note first owed an
enforceable obligation." Though the facts are not clear, it seems
that in Barker a vendor was allowed executory process against
his two vendees even though the authentic act of sale did not
show the endorsement of the notes which it recited the vendees
drew to the order of each other, endorsed, and delivered to the
vendor. The court said that though the vendor could not show
an endorsement by authentic evidence, he could show by such
evidence that the notes were transferred to him. 12
or bearer (if it is a bearer instrument) is the note's holder. LA. R.S. 7:191
(1950).
10. A note, even though it is not bearer paper, may be transferred without
endorsement. LA. R.S. 7:49 (1950) clearly intimates this, and a number of cases
have so held. Gaines v. Fitzgibbons, 168 La. 260, 121 So. 763 (1929); Griffin
& Dyson v. Cowan, Dykers & Co., 15 La. Ann. 487 (1860) ; Hughes v. Harrison,
2 La. 89 (1830) ; Delta Loan Co. v. Riley, 199 So. 671 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1941).
Though such a transferee is not a holder of the note within the meaning of the
negotiable instruments law, he is nevertheless the note's owner, having acquired
the right to the endorsement of the transferor and such title as the transferor
had. LA. R.S. 7:49 (1950). Consequently, if he can show his ownership by
authentic evidence, he should not be barred from executory process because he
cannot so show an endorsement of the note. Whether he exercises his right to
have his transferor endorse the note should be immaterial.
A number of cases have refused executory process where the creditor could not
show himself holder of the note by authentic evidence. However, in these cases
it was not shown by authentic evidence that the creditor was the note's owner.
Van Raalte v. Congregation of the Mission, 39 La. Ann. 617, 2 So. 190 (1887) ;
Miller, Lyon & Co. v. Cappel, 36 La. Ann. 264 (1884) ; Burns v. Naughton, 24
La. Ann. 476 (1872) ; Fowler v. Beatty, 10 La. Ann. 275 (1855) ; Commercial
Bank v. Poland, 6 La. Ann. 477 (1851) ; Dakin v. Ganahl, 13 La. 512 (1839) ;
Allied Finance Co. v. Robertson, 131 So. 2d 122 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1961) ; Brock
v. Messina, 200 So. 511 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1941). In the Brock case, supra, it
was argued that the negotiable instruments law, which provided that if a note
was transferred without endorsement the transferee received such rights as the
transferor possessed, changed the requirements of executory process so that it was
no longer necessary for a transferee to present authentic evidence that the note
was endorsed to him or was bearer paper. This argument was rejected on the.
ground that in codifying the substantive law of negotiable instruments, the legis-
lature did not intend to alter the procedural methods of enforcing obligations.
Under the rationale of Brock it is clear that a creditor should not be barred from
executory process merely because he cannot bring himself within the negotiable
instruments law's definition of holder.
11. Barker v. Banks, 15 La. 453 (1840). In Barker it appears that two
vendees made notes payable to each other, endorsed the notes, and transferred
them to the vendor. Technically, under the negotiable instruments law, the
vendor would be the second holder of these notes. LA. R.S. 7:191 (1950). How-
ever, in this transaction he was clearly the first person to whom an enforceable
obligation was owed.
12. Barker v. Banks, 15 La. 453, 455 (1840) : "This document [authentic
act on which executory process issued] establishes that the vendees were sureties
for each other, and that the security was taken in the form of endorsed notes.
Admitting that the sureties did not endorse the notes, the principals are not the
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The court in the instant case seems to have adopted this
interpretation of the Barker case. After noting that the mort-
gagors had conceded that plaintiffs were the first and only
holders of the notes, the majority concluded that Barker was
applicable to the instant situation. The instant case was dis-
tinguished from those cases holding that an endorsement in
blank must be shown by authentic evidence in order to entitle
the bearer of the note to executory process on the ground that
in the former cases the holders of the notes had been transferees,
while in the instant case the persons seeking executory process
were the original holders.18
Had the instant case only allowed executory process to a
mortgagee who could show his ownership of the mortgage note
by authentic evidence, it would have been substantially in line
with Barker.4  However, the decision, as it stands, goes con-
siderably beyond Barker. In the earlier case the creditor offered
authentic proof that he was the notes' owner. This was not so
in the instant case, however, for in it there was no authentic
evidence to prove the plaintiffs holders or owners.' 5
less liable to their vendor; for the act of sale proves that they delivered the
notes to the latter as evidence of the price of the sale."
13. Perhaps technically the mortgagors in the instant case were the original
holders of the notes, becoming such after their endorsement and prior to the
delivery of the notes to the mortgagees. LA. R.S. 7:184 (1950) provides that a
note drawn to the maker's own order is not complete until he has endorsed it.
And under id. 7:191 the bearer of a bearer instrument is its holder. However,
plaintiffs were clearly the original creditors. And though the court relied on the
idea that plaintiffs were original holders and owners of the notes, it is difficult
to see why this should make any difference. The fact that the plaintiff in the
Barker case was the original creditor does not appear a significant point on which
to distinguish Barker from those cases refusing executory process to a transferee
who could not show himself a holder by authentic evidence. However, the fact
that the plaintiff in Barker could show himself owner of the notes by authentic
evidence while the transferees in the distinguished cases could not is a significant
point of distinction. In the instant case the plaintiffs could show themselves
neither holders nor owners by authentic evidence. On this point, the instant case
is distinguishable from Barker. This seemed to have concerned Justice Summers,
who pointed out in his dissent that plaintiffs were not named in the act of mort-
gage.
14. Both cases would, if this had been the factual situation in the instant,
case, have allowed executory process where the one seeking it showed himself
owner of the notes by authentic evidence. However, the instant case had an added
complication in this respect. The authentic act of mortgage recited that the
mortgagors were indebted to the "Holder or Holders" of the notes. Plaintiffs
could not show themselves holders without showing. the endorsement, and this
could not be proved by authentic evidence. The court did not discuss this point,
and by relying on an admission that plaintiffs were holders, avoided it.
15. The authentic act of mortgage did not show the notes to be endorsed In
blank. If it had, plaintiffs would have been able to prove themselves holders by
authentic evidence. LA. R.S. 7:191 (1950). Nor did the act of mortgage name
plaintiffs as mortgagees. If it had, plaintiffs could have shown ownership by,
authentic proof. See note 10 aupra,
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To find plaintiffs holders the Supreme Court had to rely on
an admission made before it in oral argument. By so doing, the
majority encroached upon the rule demanding strict compliance
with the requisites for executory process in two respects. First,
it allowed an admission to substitute for authentic evidence.
Second, it went beyond the evidence before the trial judge at
the time he signed the order of seizure and sale in determining
whether his order should be allowed to stand.10 Neither of these
actions appears desirable.17
16. A number of cases may be found containing language to the effect that
upon appeal from an order of seizure and sale the only question which may be
considered by the appellate court is the sufficiency of the evidence upon which the
order issued. Franek v. Brewster, 141 La. 1031, 76 So. 187 (1916) ; Peyroux v.
Lacoste, 18 La. Ann. 626 (1866) ; Dodd v. Crain, 6 Rob. 58 (La. 1843) ; Com-
mercial Credit Co. v. Melba Candy Co., 3 La. App. 267 (Orl. Cir. 1926).
Similarly there are cases involving injunctions which indicate that the controlling
issue is whether or not the evidence before the trial judge at the time he signed
the order was in proper form. Myrtle Grove Packing Co. v. Mones, 226 La. 287,
76 So. 2d 305 (1954) ; Wray v. Henry, 10 Mart.(O.S.) 222 (La. 1821). However,
no case discussing the effect of subsequent admissions before appellate courts was
discovered. Perhaps the case nearest this situation factually is Commercial Credit
Co. v. Melba Candy Co., supra. There the defendant appealed from an order of
seizure and sale on the ground that the note sued upon had not been furnished
to the trial judge. The note was filed with the district court after the appeal had
been lodged. The appellate court stated that it could take no cognizance of this
note since it was filed after appeal had been lodged and that, even if it could,
plaintiff still could not show his right to sue on the instrument by authentic
evidence. The court also said: "It is plain .. . that the actual note described
in the petition was not filed or offered either before or on the date upon which
the order of seizure and sale was issued." Id. at 269. The Code of Civil Pro-
cedure appears to envisage the propriety of the evidence before the trial judge
as the test of whether or not the order may be enjoined, for it provides that
security is not required by certain persons seeking to enjoin the seizure and sale
when "the order directing the issuance of the writ of seizure and sale was ren-
dered without sufficient authentic evidence having been submitted to the court,
or the evidence submitted was not actually authentic." (Emphasis added.) LA.
CoDE OF CIvIL PaocEDuRE art. 2753(5) (1960).
17. The right to use executory process places the creditor in an advantageous
position. This is the reason the legislature has required that it issue only upon
authentic evidence and this is why the courts have generally required strict com-
pliance with the requisites for its issuance. The creditor assembles his evidence
and brings it to court, obtaining an order authorizing the sheriff to seize and
sell the debtor's property. The burden of preventing this sale is then thrown upon
the debtor, who can do so by injunction or suspensive appeal. There is no reason
why this burden of action should fall upon the debtor where the creditor has not
complied with the law. And when the debtor seeks to prevent the sale, it seems
that logically he does so on the ground that the order of seizure and sale should
not have issued. Whether the creditor had evidence upon which he could have
obtained a valid order should be of no importance. The point is that he did not
present it and the order which he did obtain was based upon insufficient evidence.
Probably the court in the instant case was moved by what it believed to be the
equities of the situation. But executory process is not a place where equitable
considerations should carry much weight. Denial of executory process does not
deny the creditor his right to enforce the debt. It only prevents him from shift-
ing the burden of action to the debtor.
18. Though the instant case was decided under the 1870 Code of Practice,
it is doubtful that its authoritative effect has been lessened by the adoption of
the Code of Civil- Procedure. The Code of Civil Procedure is no more specific
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In the writer's opinion the prospective effect of the instant
case should be limited strictly.'8 Since the majority relied upon
an oral admission before it, a strict reading of the case does not
authorize the district judge to issue an order of seizure and sale
upon evidence such as here presented to him; but the opinion
indicates that where the order is issued it will be sustained if
the mortgagor judicially admits the mortgagee's rights.
Robert B. Butler III
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE- RIGHT TO BILL OF PARTICULARS AFTER
ARRAIGNMENT
Defendant was indicted for theft under a short form indict-
ment.' After the arraignment, at which his counsel was present,
the defendant filed several motions, among them a motion for a
bill of particulars. The trial judge refused this motion for the
sole reason that it came too late, having been filed after the
arraignment and five days prior to the trial.2 The case pro-
ceeded to trial and the defendant was convicted as charged. On
appeal to the Louisiana Supreme Court, held, reversed. Refusal
to grant a motion for a bill of particulars by one indicted under
a short form indictment was an abuse of discretion where the
only reason given for the refusal was that the motion was filed
after the arraignment and five days before trial. State v.
Barnes, 242 La. 102, 134 So. 2d 890 (1961).
on the question of authentic evidence to show ownership of a note for the pur-
poses of executory process than was the Code of Practice. The comments indicate
the drafters' intention was that prior jurisprudence be followed where available.
LA. CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE art. 2635 (1960) and comments thereunder.
1. LA. R.S. 15:235 (1950) provides for the use of the short form indictments
in the particular cases specified in the article.
2. State v. Barnes, 242 La. 102, 134 So. 2d 890, 891 (1961). It appears from
the district attorney's petition for rehearing that the motions of the defendant,
including the motion for a bill of particulars, were filed for the purpose of delay-
ing the trial again after one continuance had been granted. The petition for
rehearing contains the following language: "Barnes was arraigned January 6,
1961, entered a plea of not guilty and his case set for trial for February 9, 1961,
and on February 9, 1961, was continued to February 20, 1961, and on Thursday,
February 16, 1961, filed the Motion for Bill of Particulars; Motion for Continu-
ance; A Demurrer; a Motion To Quash, knowing full well the case was set on
Monday, February 20. The motions were taken up and overruled on Friday be-
fore trial on Monday."
The defendant, in his motion for a bill of particulars, requested the following
information: (1) whether the alleged theft was committed with the consent of
the owner of the stolen property, or by means of fraudulent practices; (2) if it
was with the consent of the owner, the manner of the misappropriation; and (3)
the name of the servant or employee of the'owner involved in the transaction.
